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Compensating for climate change loss and damage  
Introduction 
The goal of avoiding harmful impacts of climate change has been at the heart of the 
international response to global climate change since the adoption of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. However, such impacts, which 
are increasingly referred to as ‘losses and damages’, have emerged only recently as the focus 
of a distinctive strand of international climate change policy (UNFCCC 2012; UNFCCC 2014; 
Huq, Roberts and Fenton 2013). Instead, UNFCCC negotiations have focused primarily on 
questions of mitigation (the prevention of climate change by reducing emissions, or 
enhancing withdrawals, of greenhouse gases) and adaptation (the moderation of the harm, 
and exploitation of the benefits, of climate change through adjustments in infrastructure, 
institutions and behaviour). A growing appreciation that mitigation and adaption policies will 
not prevent a range of adverse impacts on human and natural systems, however, has led to 
the UNFCCC acknowledging the importance of a new type of policy that addresses climate 
change losses and damages that occur after mitigation and adaptation has been attempted. 
Nevertheless, the UNFCCC has yet to adopt an account of climate change loss and damage 
that is sufficiently precise to identify which changes in human or natural systems count as a 
losses or damages, which agents should cover the costs of interventions designed to address 
loss and damage, or what ought to be the normative goal of these interventions. In short, the 
discourse of loss and damage has generated significant confusion amongst policymakers and 
practitioners and requires careful elaboration if it is to become a ‘third pillar’ of climate 
change policy (see Surminski and Lopez 2014: 267-8; Fekte and Sakdapolrak 2014).  
 Assuming that the costs of addressing loss and damage should be pooled by the 
international community, rather than simply being left to burden the agents initially 
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experiencing these costs, which normative principles and policies should guide this 
enterprise? A large literature in normative theory addressing the distribution of 
responsibilities of climate mitigation and adaptation bears on this question.1  However, 
addressing the question of ‘burden sharing’ is only one component of a comprehensive theory 
of climate change loss and damage. Prior to the determination of who bears the responsibility 
of financing policies of loss and damage lies the question, largely undeveloped in the 
literature, of what the goal of loss and damage policies should be and why this goal is justified.  
 In this article, we address this gap in the literature by developing a normative framework 
that specifies the goals of loss and damage policy in terms of the concept of climatic 
compensation. In the next section, we clarify the meaning of ‘loss and damage’ and how it 
relates to other responses to climate change. In the following section, drawing upon Robert 
Goodin’s influential account of compensatory justice, we argue that the international 
community’s response to loss and damage should aim to compensate victims of climate 
change, particularly those residing in developing states, for the unjustified and unexpected 
disruptions in ways of life it causes. The compensatory account, we argue, rests on a 
sophisticated understanding of the adverse impacts of climate change due to it endorsing two 
key distinctions: ‘ends’ versus ‘means’ and ‘losses’ versus ‘damages’. In the following section, 
we outline a new typology of compensatory responses based on our interpretation of these 
two distinctions before responding, in the following section, to three objections that might 
be raised to the compensatory account. A concluding section sketches three distinctive policy 
implications of our account.  
 
                                                          
1 For contrasting accounts of climatic burden-sharing, see Shue (1999), Page (2008), Vanderheiden (2008:45-80), 
Caney (2010a).   
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Introducing climate change loss and damage 
Championed by developing states, especially the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS 
2008), the discourse of loss and damage has grown steadily in influence since its incorporation 
into the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 2007) and subsequent development in the form of the 
Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage associated with Climate 
Change Impacts (UNFCCC 2014). Having acknowledged that ‘loss and damage associated with 
the adverse effects of climate change includes, and in some cases involves more than, that 
which can be reduced by adaptation’, the UNFCCC (2014: 6-7) assigned three primary 
functions to the WIM: (1) ‘enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk 
management approaches to loss and damage’; (2) ‘strengthening dialogue, coordination, 
coherence and synergies among relevant stakeholders’; and (3) ’enhancing action and 
support, including finance, technology and capacity-building.’ The WIM, however, has yet to 
specify how assistance will be provided by the international community  to states seeking to 
implement policies addressing loss and damage and no distinctive funding stream has yet 
been agreed for this task (UNFCCC 2015: 7-8). No agreement has yet been reached, moreover, 
as to the normative basis for the significant international financial transfers that will be 
necessary to transform the WIM from an information gathering initiative into a 
comprehensive approach to reduce the misery and disruption caused by unprevented or 
unpreventable climate changes. Instead, attempts to develop the WIM have been marred by 
disputes between developed and developing states as to how the concept of loss and damage 
can be defined so that it is action-guiding without undermining existing mitigation and 
adaptation commitments (Surminsky and Lopez 2014: 1-2).  
 Although some of the disputes over climate change loss and damage within the UNFCCC 
policy architecture reflect deeper conflicts of national interest and ideology, it is clear that a 
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major stumbling block to further progress in this arena is a series of gaps in our understanding 
of the meaning, application, and justification of the concept of loss and damage. This is 
evident in the text of the Paris Agreement which offers continued support for the WIM 
without addressing who should finance the WIM, how much financing is required, or how the 
financing should be allocated amongst potential claimants (UNFCCC 2015:7-8, 26). In what 
follows, we argue that the UNFCCC’s treatment of loss and damage can be enhanced through 
a more systematic understanding of the appropriate goals of loss and damage and how these 
goals are justified.  
 According to the UNFCCC, climate change losses and damages can be defined as ‘the actual 
and potential manifestation of climate change impacts that negatively affect human and 
natural systems’ (UNFCCC 2012: 4). The problem is that this general statement can be 
interpreted in of a number of ways. Losses and damages, for example, are treated by the 
UNFCCC as broadly equivalent to the ‘adverse impacts of climate change’ and it is not 
specified whether these impacts are those that could have been prevented by mitigation and 
adaptation (unprevented but preventable impacts) and or which could not have been 
prevented by mitigation and adaptation (unpreventable impacts) (Chambwera and Heal 
2014: 8; Frankhauser, Dietz and Gradwell 2014: 8). The UNFCCC is also silent on other salient 
issues such as whether ‘losses’ are equivalent to ‘damages’ and whether the discourse of loss 
and damage should be focused on all post-mitigation/post-adaptation costs or only those that 
arise in the poorest states (Surminski and Lopez 2014: 2-3). 
 According to the definition we adopt in this paper, loss and damage refers to the unjustified 
disruptions in the lives of individuals and communities, whether permanent or otherwise, that 
are attributable to anthropogenic climate change and which remain after mitigation and 
adaptation efforts has been attempted (see Verheyen 2012: 5-6; Frankhauser, Dietz and 
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Gradwell 2014: 8-9). Such disruptions, which may be economic or non-economic in origin, will 
be extensive for three reasons. First, existing mitigation and adaptation actions have not 
prevented some physical impacts of climate change already occurring and consequently 
giving rise to loss and damage (Warner et al. 2012; IPCC 2014b 4-8). Second, a further and 
substantial set of future losses and damages  is now unpreventable by mitigation due to slow 
onset climate changes (such as oceanic expansion and acidification) that are now ‘locked in’ 
due to inertial properties of the climate system (IPCC 2014a:  20-26; IPCC 2014b: 20-25). Third, 
only a proportion of the climatic impacts that cannot (or will not) be prevented by climate 
change mitigation are amenable to policies of adaptation since behavioural and institutional 
adjustment is highly constrained in states that are reliant on ecosystem services, or have 
limited capacity to respond to environmental disasters, or are located in regions that will be 
first to experience extreme changes in climate (Hope 2009: 102; Dow et al 2013; UNFCCC 
2012 7-16). 
 In terms of the normative dimension of developing the UNFCCC’s approach to loss and 
damage, we defend here a compensatory (as opposed to a resilience-based, risk-based, or 
insurance-based) account. The compensatory account – together with ‘risk management and 
prevention’ and ‘insurance’ – comprise the three constituent parts of the loss and damage 
discourse as it was introduced in the international negotiations by the Association of Small 
Island States (2008) and subsequently taken up by the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2009).  The rationale 
for our focus on compensation, rather than resilience or insurance, is that a compensatory 
‘ethos’ is the distinctive feature of loss and damage as it has developed under the UNFCCC. 
Risk management and risk prevention, for example, capture effectively the goal of ‘increasing 
the resilience’ of a population vulnerable to adverse impacts of climate change through 
behavioural and institutional adjustment in order to limit the extent of loss and damage and 
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hence best seen as a part of the discourse and concept of adaptation. Climate change 
insurance, however, while clearly a policy addressing loss and damage, can be seen at a 
deeper level as a species of compensation in that it has the objective of making agents who 
qualify for assistance by paying premiums into an insurance scheme ‘whole again’ after they 
experience loss or damage as a result of an extreme weather, or slow onset climate change, 
event which is covered by the rules of the scheme (Duus-Otterström and Jagers 2011: 326-9). 
Yet, compensation as a concept is broader than, and not reducible to insurance, and it is also 
usefully compatible with a number of innovative legal and policy mechanisms such as climate 
change compensation commissions, international solidarity funds, and international litigation 
(Farber 2008; Burkett 2009; Burkett 2015).   
       
A normative framework for responding to climatic loss and damage 
A comprehensive normative theory of loss and damage must explain what the goal of the 
international response to loss and damage should be and how this goal can be justified. 
According to the account offered here, the distinctive injustice arising from climatic losses 
and damages is that they disrupt unjustifiably the settled social and environmental conditions 
that victims of climate change reasonably came to rely upon in the process through which 
they framed and pursued their valued objectives prior to the loss or damage they sustained. 
Such disruptions arise because mitigation and adaptation, even if successful in their own 
terms, cannot (or will not) prevent losses and damages from blighting the existence of 
individuals in many states. The goal of climatic compensation is to make such victims ‘whole 
again’ in the sense that they not merely survive the losses and damages they experience but 
also go on to lead lives ‘as well off as they would have been, had it not been for the loss’ 
(Goodin 1989: 61; 2013: 484-5). This, in turn, is a matter of restoring the conditions that 
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enable an individual suffering an unjustified disruption to live the life they chose for 
themselves prior to the disruption (Goodin 1991: 145, 157; see also O’Neill 1987: 76).  
 The compensatory approach is usefully viewed as a victim-centred (rather than 
perpetrator-centred) and person-centred (rather than object-centred) method of neutralizing 
injustice (Goodin 2013: 480). It does not seek to punish those responsible for climate change, 
or those profiting from the activities that drive climate change. Neither is limited to the 
transfer of lost, or damaged, objects back to their rightful owners. Instead, it seeks to restore 
the general condition, or well-being, of those adversely affected by climate change to what it 
was before this harm occurred. In this sense, as a species of ‘corrective justice’, the 
compensatory approach seeks to re-establish fully, and as swiftly as possible, the condition 
that a disrupted life was in prior to a climatic disruption. This approach to loss and damage 
does not seek to prevent this disruption in the first place by making all potential victims more 
resilient to the adverse effects of climate change (climatic resilience) or to improve the 
condition of agents, to some pre-specified degree, who pool premiums so that their qualifying 
losses and damages may be ameliorated through financial awards (climatic insurance).      
 If the aim of loss and damage policies is to ‘deal with disruption’ to human lives by making 
them whole again, a normative framework for loss and damage must distinguish different 
kinds of disruption and give some guidance as to their relative moral significance. To construct 
such a framework, we need to consider three questions. First, what components of a person’s 
life are of sufficient importance to merit a response under a loss and damage compensation 
policy (the ‘currency of disruption’ question).  Second, what are the different ways in which 
these value components of a life might be disrupted (the ‘mechanism of disruption’ question). 
Third, how does compensation correct, or rectify, the disruption caused by climatic loss and 
damage (the ‘method of compensation’ question). 
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The ‘currency’ of climatic disruption, loss and damage   
A normative theory of loss and damage must make explicit why climatic losses and damages 
to environmental and human resource systems are morally significant: in essence, why should 
we care when a person suffers a loss or damage through climate change? In order to answer 
this question, we endorse the view that resources matter from a normative point of view for 
the way they contribute to various human goals and projects: what they allow people to do 
or to be (Sen 1999). Losses and damages to, e.g., freshwater resources are of concern because 
of the impact of this loss or damage upon the goal of being healthy.  In short, human beings 
have interests in being able to pursue important goals and projects.   
 Although the loss and damage literature gives examples of objects/resources, it is the 
thought that losses and damages to these objects will compromise human ends that 
normatively justifies a response to climate change.  Appeals to the implications of potential 
or actualised climatic losses and damages for ‘human security’ (e.g. O’Brien et al., 2007; 
Warner et al. 2012), human development (UNHDP 2007), human rights (Caney 2010b), or 
capabilities (Holland 2014), are all based on the idea that objects and resources matter 
because of their relation to various important human ends. Thus we talk of loss and damage 
to objects and resources because of the concern that this will lead to loss of or damage to 
certain important human ends; and whether compensation makes an individual ‘whole again’ 
will depend on the extent to which they can pursue the same ends as they could before the 
climate-induced disruption.   
 The value of ends. Particular objects, such as buildings, animal and plant species, rivers, 
can relate to multiple ends.  For example, a river eco-system that is severely affected by 
climate change might be regarded by some individuals as an important source of water, by 
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others as a good site for recreation, and by other individuals as the home of a goddess.  In the 
case of the first, the river is linked to the end of securing water for drinking and irrigation. In 
the second, the river is linked to the end of leisure. In the third, it is linked to the end of 
pursuing a spiritual life.  Where objects are linked to one or more ends, there might be 
conflicts over them and decisions will have to be made about which ends have priority.  A full 
account of important human ends cannot be given here.  However, we can at least note that 
in the literature on distributive justice, some ends are relatively uncontroversial.  No matter 
what personal projects and goals and individual adopts as ends for him or herself, it is 
reasonable to expect that they will still value being nourished, sheltered and in reasonable 
health, and so will require the opportunity to secure at least basic food, water and shelter.  
Such ends appear in many conceptions of distributive justice, as well as human security and 
human rights.  Other ends, such as raising a family, pursuing a career, developing a talent for 
a sport, living in accordance with nature, artistic endeavour, or a life of religious devotion find 
places in only some conceptions of a good human life.     
The relationship between means and ends. Particular objects can also relate to ends in 
different ways.  Things that contribute to human ends can be categorised as means or as 
constituents, depending on the nature of their contribution to any given end (Raz 1986: 200).  
Means are conceptually separate from, and contingently connected to, the end that they 
serve.  They cause the end to be achieved, or at least make it more likely that it is achieved, 
but there is no deeper connection between them.  If the object is a constituent, then it is 
conceived as one element of the valuable end.  Its absence affects the value of that end in 
addition to any contribution to its achievement.  Consider the loss of traditional species in the 
Arctic.  In a 2005 petition, Inuit groups raised concerns about many impacts of climate change 
on the Arctic, including the decline of caribou that some Inuit groups hunt for subsistence (ICC 
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2005).  We might say that caribou are a means by which Inuit groups achieve the end of 
nourishment.  A natural response to the loss of this means would be to make other means, 
such as replacement foods, so that the end is not compromised.  The petition made a further 
claim, however, that the hunting of caribou was a key aspect of Inuit life. Specialist skills and 
knowledge were developed around the practice; and the subsistence economy, of which 
caribou hunting was an integral component, was key to the distinctiveness of the Inuit 
communities.  Maintaining this cultural distinctiveness, it was implied, was itself an important 
end, which was compromised by the decline in caribou, regardless of the availability of food 
in local shops.  According to our account, the Petition presented caribou and the hunting of 
them not simply as a means to nourishment but as a constituent of the Inuit culture, the 
preservation of which is an important end.   
 Disputing a means to a valuable end. Disagreements over whether any given object counts 
as a means to, or a constituent of, a particular end are to be expected.  Some might wonder 
whether it is possible ever to ascertain whether an object is valued merely as a means or as a 
constituent of an end.  Although the difficulties of making distinctions between ends and 
means should not be underestimated, doing so is not necessarily impossible.  One approach 
is to listen to an individual’s account of the importance of the object in question. An account 
will differ qualitatively depending on whether the object is regarded by the individual as a 
means or as a constituent.  For example, an individual who regards a piece of land under 
threat from sea-level rise as a constituent of an end (they may think that it is a sacred burial 
site and thus a constituent of their religious practices) will be more likely to talk about how 
the site came to be regarded as sacred, how long it has been so regarded, and various stories 
(actual and mythological) in which it featured. An individual, by contrast, who sees a stretch 
of land under threat from sea level rise as a means to an end will not be able to tell the same 
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stories since they will be confined to talking about how various features of the resource are 
instrumental to some end they endorse.  Put simply, the description of the object will be more 
elaborate if the individual regards it as a constituent of an end than if she regards it as a means 
to an end.  This is because the former requires an explanation of the end of which it is a part 
and its relations with other constituent elements, whereas the latter requires merely an 
explanation of how its properties cause the end to be served.2    
 The priority of ends over means. As we have argued, it is ends that are valued for 
themselves rather than the means; and the loss or damage of a constituent is, all things being 
equal, more serious than the loss of a means to an end.  The loss or damage of a constituent 
entails that the end is necessarily compromised, whereas if a means is lost or damaged, the 
end it serves might or might not be compromised depending on the ready availability of other 
means to that end.  Thus, a compromise to a constituent is a compromise to an end and we 
shall henceforth use ‘compromise to constituent’ and ‘compromise to end’ interchangeably.  
However, an object might be both a constituent element of one end and a means to another 
end that is regarded as more important.  The question about what kinds of ends should be 
regarded as important is, of course, contested. What can be said at the level of principle is 
that, because ends are more important than means, when an object can be conceived either 
as a constituent of an end or as a means to another end, it is the former that should be given 
priority because it is worse to treat something that is intrinsically valuable as a means than it 
is to treat a means as intrinsically valuable.  This is assuming that the ends in question of are 
                                                          
2  It might be thought  the “ends” and “means” distinction is always unclear, as the same environmental resource 
might be a means of meeting subsistence needs (and economic end) and also a constituent e.g. of a secure 
cultural identity (a non-economic end).  But perhaps this is best understood not as a “blurring” between means 
and ends, but, having established that the same environmental resource serves both an economic and a non-
economic end, a question of which end is given priority.  Where there are conflicts we suggest below that priority 
should be given to the least well off.   
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equal importance.  When it is the question of which out of two ends should have priority, we 
suggest that extra weighting to the end proposed by those who are the least advantaged in 
terms of the less/non-controversial ends. For example, if some individuals regard a piece of 
land as good farmland but others regard it as a sacred site, then, assuming there are no ways 
of making a compromise, the end adopted by the least well off should be the one taken into 
account.3   
 
The ‘mechanism’ of climatic disruption, loss and damage   
In the growing literature on loss and damage, a qualitative difference in disruption is 
sometimes, but not always, picked out by stipulating a difference between ‘loss’ and damage’. 
The UNFCCC defines ‘climate losses’ as ‘negative impacts in relation to which reparation or 
restoration is impossible’, whereas climate damages are ‘negative impacts in relation to which 
reparation or restoration is possible’ (UNFCCC 2012: 3 - our emphasis).  Some have 
interpreted this as a distinction between a ‘loss’ (which is permanent) and a ‘damage’ (which 
is in theory reversible) (see Kreft et al. 2012). This is a significant distinction for normative 
purposes.  A permanent alteration to the pattern of an individual’s life is more disruptive than 
a temporary one.   
 However, there is another relevant distinction, which is more captured by a more natural 
understanding of ‘loss’ and ‘damage’ as separate pathways of disruption.  If something is lost, 
a thing that is previous available to an agent has become unavailable (e.g. a flood victim’s 
belongings have been displaced in a flooding event).  This might be on a temporary basis or 
                                                          
3 To see this, imagine group A regards a piece of land as a prime farming site whereas for B, that piece of land is 
sacred.  If the As are less well off than the Bs in terms of the lesser controversial ends, then we might expect 
those ends to be served by using the land as the As wish.  If, however Bs are less well off than As in terms of less 
controversial ends, then it is wrong that individuals in B are further disadvantaged by having the As’ conception 
of ends prevail to the detriment of the Bs’.                
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permanent.   If a thing is damaged, however, it remains available.  If it is a means, it is less 
able to fulfil its function and is thereby impaired (if a storm damages a building, for example, 
then we can assume that this building is impaired in its provision of shelter). Similarly, if an 
agent is pursuing an end, (e.g. developing a talent for fishing) he or she may encounter 
impairments or setbacks in its achievement (e.g. if materials used to make nets become less 
reliable) or that achievement of or pursuit of an end might be rendered impossible (e.g. all 
readily accessible rivers and ponds dry up).  In the first case, we can say that an end is 
damaged, in the sense of being impaired, in the second, we might say that the end is not 
available to the agent, or colloquially, that is has been lost to him or her.  All things being 
equal, having a means or an end become unavailable is more disruptive than having a means 
or end impaired since, in the former case, it might still be possible to continue as before, albeit 
with greater effort.  If something is rendered unavailable to an agent, the agent is left with no 
choice but to change his or her behaviour.   
 The types of response that will be appropriate to the residual impacts of climate change 
will depend on the kind of disruption experienced.  Of particular relevance here is whether 
the disruption concerns the availability of an end or valuable objective or whether it is a 
disruption in the availability of the means to that end or objective.  Whilst the distinction 
between temporary and permanent disruption is normatively important, it does not affect 
the type of response merited to an actual disruption, but rather sets priorities for avoiding 
disruptions, as well as the urgency/importance of such response and possible conditions 
attached to it.            
 
Methods of justly compensating for climatic disruption, loss and damage   
Having clarified the nature of climatic loss and damage, as well as the mechanism through 
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which these losses and damages arise, we are now in a position to sketch an account of how 
such disruptions might be corrected (or ‘neutralized’) through a scheme of climatic 
compensation. There are essentially two methods through which climatic compensation 
might be pursued: ‘means-based compensation’ and ‘ends-based compensation’ (Goodin 
1989: 60-6). 
 Means-based compensation can be pursued in three different ways.  If a means is made 
unavailable to an agent due to climate change, the most obvious response is to see whether 
it can be returned to them. If the means is impaired, then it simply be necessary to repair it, 
by replacing a certain component (e.g. a building might need a new roof after a storm).  If 
neither means-restitution nor means-repair is possible, the means in question may be 
replaced in full by another object.  ‘Means-replacing compensation’ aims to leave an agent in 
the same condition as they were in just before the unjustified injury was inflicted upon by 
providing the victim a bundle of alternative goods and opportunities that will provide the 
‘same objective capacity to promote exactly the same end as does the [original bundle]’ 
(Goodin 1989: 65). An example of such compensation is a financial award from an 
international compensatory fund or commission to an individual farmer for the purpose of 
replacing livestock or equipment after a climate change-related storm surge seriously 
damages their farm. The central normative feature of the means-based methods is that by 
restoring, repairing or compensating, i.e. substituting, it leaves the injured party being ‘whole 
again’ in that they are able to pursue all of the important human ends that they affirmed 
before the climatic impact.  
 If none of these means-based responses are available, then the ends that they serve are 
compromised.  Ends might also be compromised if a constituent is rendered unavailable due 
to climate change (recall the example of caribou hunting in the previous section).  In such 
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cases, we need to turn to ends-based methods of compensation.  The first of these is ends-
restitution (e.g. restoring environmental conditions conducive to caribou hunting).  However, 
due to the difficulties of this, it is likely that the most called-upon category will be ends-based 
compensation. Ends-based compensation aims to provide the victim with a bundle of goods 
and opportunities that will enable them ‘to pursue some other ends in a way that leaves them 
subjectively as well off overall as they would have been had they suffered no loss at all’ 
(Goodin 1989: 60).  In such cases, a person is left non-identically situated even though they 
are as well of as they were all things considered since they have been forced into adopting a 
new set of valued ends and not merely a new, or repaired, set of means to these objectives. 
As such, ends-based compensation is the appropriate response when there is no means-
substitution, restitution, or repair that will suffice to make the victim whole again. In such 
circumstances, people must be given the resources necessary for them to pursue substitute 
ends that deliver the same satisfaction but which do not fulfil the exact same role as the 
previously endorsed ends. Rather than enabling her to continue her life without hindrance, 
we might say, ends-based compensation provides assistance to a victim to change it.  
 As with means-replacing compensation, ends-displacement compensation enables an 
agent to ‘get back on their feet’, but by setting them on a different path rather than recreating 
perfectly their original path. Since this new path expresses a form of unjustified disruption, 
ends-based compensation should be seen as inferior to means-based methods and should 
only be considered if they are not possible. Consider two examples of ends-displacing 
compensation in the climatic context: education and training for a person who has been 
forced to abandon a valued occupation because of persistent drought and financial support 
to enable a person to resettle to another part of a state (or even a different state) in response 
to rising sea levels. In both cases, victims of climate change face a fundamental disruption to 
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the coherence and unity of their life plans and not merely an unexpected substitution of one 
means (to an end) for another means (to an end). 
 It is worth acknowledging that climate compensation is limited in scope due to its focus on 
making victims of an injustice ‘whole again’ by providing them with replacement ends and 
means, or repaired or restored means. In some cases, the losses or damages inflicted on a 
community may resist full compensation due to extreme cost or technological barriers. The 
compensatory approach may not, therefore, generate convincing accounts of what the 
international community should do in some circumstances such as when a climatic disruption 
is so severe that some of the associated losses and damages are ‘uncompensable’ in the sense 
that the ends affected matter so much to the people experiencing disruption that there is no 
obvious way of making them ‘whole again.’  Certain (but not all) types of ‘non-economic’, or 
non-material, losses due to climate change may fall into this category (Frankhauser, Dietz and 
Gradwell et al 2014; Adger et al, 2011: 16; Morrissey and Smith 2013).  For example, it is hard 
to see how the loss of an ancestral burial site could be compensated for. Indeed, there is a 
sense in which asking how much compensation should be awarded seems inappropriate in 
cases like this. According to the account proposed here, such losses may need to be 
supplemented by a type of ‘perpetrator-centred’ response that invokes measures of 
‘satisfaction.’ Measures of climatic satisfaction (such as public apologies and disclosures, truth 
and reconciliation initiatives, commemoration and memorialization) are designed to restore 
‘relations of respect’ between agents differentially affected by and responsible for, climate 
change (see Thompson 2002: 34; Hyvarinen 2012: 5) and may accompany the ‘victim-centred’ 
measures that compensation can offer. Insights from the reparations literature also suggest 
there an expressed commitment to ensure that a similar situation does not arise in future 
would also be a suitable measure of satisfaction (e.g. Burkett 2009).    
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 To summarise, the compensatory approach responds to loss and damage by making 
victims ‘whole again’ after a climate-related disruption to the conditions that they reasonably 
relied upon to frame and pursue their life-plans. Making whole again might be achieved either 
by ‘means-based methods’ or ‘ends-based methods’. Where neither is sufficient, measures 
of satisfaction should be offered. 
Objections and responses 
We have space to discuss three objections to the compensatory account. Although we cannot 
offer a full defence we hope the discussion will serve as a basis for future debate. 
 Attribution, causation and climatic compensation. The compensatory model is vulnerable 
to the objection that, despite the fact that human activity is certainly a significant driver of 
climate change, it is not possible to prove that anthropogenic climate change was uniquely 
responsible for any particular loss or damage creating event a vulnerable population faces 
since similar events frequently occur as a consequence of natural climate variability. Since any 
extreme weather event could theoretically have occurred anyway, a state requesting 
compensation for loss and damage from the international community could not reasonably 
claim that the loss or damage creating event would not have occurred ‘but for’ anthropogenic 
climate change or, by extension, the excess greenhouse gas emissions of other states. While 
the IPCC reported in 2012 that it was ‘very likely that the length, frequency, and/or intensity 
of warm spells or heat waves will increase over most land areas’, for example, it also added 
that ‘attribution of single extreme events to anthropogenic climate change is challenging’ 
(IPCC 2012: 112). The attribution problem may seem to undermine the application of the 
compensatory paradigm to climate change losses and damages since compensation appears 
to presuppose ‘but for’ causation as the appropriate standard for linking recipients and 
providers of compensation in that the former must be able to show that the loss and damage 
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accruing in its territory would not have occurred ‘but for’ the negligent behaviour of the latter 
(Allen and Lord 2004: 551). It seems safe to assume that this issue is one of several concerns 
that led to the final text of the Paris Agreement including the assertion that ‘the Agreement 
does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation’ (UNFCCC 2015: 8)   
Two opposing responses to the attribution problem may be offered. Defensively, the 
notion of ‘probabilistic attribution’ may be developed to reconcile climatic compensation with 
standard legal notions of harm and liability. The idea is that the fact that anthropogenic 
climate change contributed to making the occurrence of a loss or damage creating climatic 
event ‘more likely’ and this sense of ‘probabilistic causation’ can be appealed to when 
upholding an agent’s claim for climatic compensation  (Allen et al 2007: 1385-6; Huggel et al 
2013: 694-5). The cumulative greenhouse gas emissions of the international community, we 
can say, ‘helped to cause’ a loss or damage by increasing the chance that the event behind 
this loss or damage would occur (Allen and Lord 2004: 552; Farber 2008: 401-2). On this view, 
a claimant launching a claim for compensation must be able to show their injuries were made 
more likely by a risk factor for which another agent is responsible, but the claimant would not 
have to maintain that this risk factor was responsible for all of the risk of the adverse event 
occurring (Allen and Lord 2004: 552; Allen et al 2007: 1393-4). 
 Offensively, it might be denied that institutionalizing compensation into the WIM’s 
treatment of loss and damage requires that a strong link between those who have caused 
climate change, and those who have suffered losses and damages as a consequence, be 
identified. Instead, the account can be developed in terms of ‘social insurance’, international 
‘solidarity funding’, or ‘international compensation commissions’ (see Farber 2008; Burkett 
2015; McKinnon 2012: 105-6). Each of these institutions rests on connecting providers and 
recipients of loss and damage finance as a consequence of their collective endorsement of a 
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principle of international solidarity rather than state liability for transboundary environmental 
harms.4 Each approach, moreover, is fully consistent with the core aim of compensatory 
justice ‘to make the victims of climate change whole again’ even if each abandons the aim ‘to 
make perpetrators pay so that their victims are made whole again.’ The reluctance of the 
international community to agree to any proposals that invoke the notion of individual state 
liability for adverse climate changes in other states5 indicates that a solidarity-based 
alternative is currently the most feasible pathway for the institutionalization of compensatory 
justice within the UNFCCC.  
 Baseless expectations and unreasonable assumptions. A notion of ‘reasonable reliance’ 
is a key element to the compensatory account.  This is because to compensate for any 
disruption to an individual’s life would at the mercy of that individual’s subjective mental 
states and hence quite unworkable.  Compensation is due only for climate-induced 
disruptions to conditions that individuals could reasonably rely on to remain stable when they 
were framing and pursing their life plans.  But have the ‘reasonable expectations’ of victims 
of loss and damage actually been violated by climate change? First, as scientific 
understanding, and the broader public awareness, of local impacts of climate change 
increases, we might question whether individuals have a reasonable expection that climatic 
conditions remain stable/their lives remain undisrupted. Any losses and damages that 
vulnerable communities are forced to endure, that is, cannot reasonably be seen as ‘bolts 
from the blue’ that go on to ‘make a mockery of their life plans’, as Goodin (1991: 157) has 
                                                          
4 Burkett (2015: 107), for example, proposes an international climate change compensation fund be initiated 
that would act as a ‘repository for all climate related claims for compensation and rehabilitation between states 
[on the basis that] beneficiary states would waive all potential outstanding disputes regarding climate-related 
reparations from other participating states’ (2015: 107).  
5 ‘Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the 
adverse effects of climate change…[but] the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or 
compensation’ (UNFCCC 2015: 26, 8). 
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put it. If we compensate only for unexpected climatic shocks then compensation for much 
loss and damage would not occur.   
Second, turning to the claim that the victims of climatic losses and damages reasonably 
believed that these should not occur, it could be argued that many losses and damages could 
have been avoided if greater attempts to build resilience had taken place within the affected 
communities. Many populations choose to continue to live in coastal areas that are now 
vulnerable to rising sea levels and storm surges, while other populations lead lives that are 
less sensitive to climate change caused disruptions. Is it unreasonable to expect the former 
to bear some of the burden associated with changes in climatic conditions since they could in 
many cases predict the occurrence of climatic disruptions in their lives? 
 In response to the ’reasonable reliance’ objection, it is worth stressing that, although it 
may no longer be reasonable epistemically  to expect losses and damages to bypass any 
particular state, it does not seem unreasonable in the normative sense for the citizens of a 
vulnerable state to claim that the natural climate variability of the Holocene should not have 
been permitted to give way to the additional climatic volatility of the Anthropocene, especially 
given the international community’s legal and moral commitment to prevent dangerous 
climate change.  Accordingly, compensation should be awarded where climate change has 
undesired effects on the affected populations even if they had prior warming that these 
effects could not, or would not, be prevented. In addition, many individuals are clearly unable 
to act upon the knowledge that the climate is changing, and potentially bringing great 
disruptions to their lives.  To return to the example of coastal communities, there are many 
individuals living in developing states who simply cannot afford to move away and thus it is 
incorrect to say that they “choose to remain”. If a coastal community was established before 
the facts of climate change became known, moreover, its individual members may have been 
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acting under the reasonable expectation that they and their children would continue to be 
members of that community in the long term.  Moving away would constitute a loss of their 
community and could itself be a disruption to their life plans.  
Recreating the dysfunctional? The compensatory account, as species of corrective (or 
‘rectificatory’) justice, seeks to reverse an unjustified disruption to a settled distribution of 
rights and resources upon which members of a community had reasonably come to rely. This 
account  does not take a strong normative stance on whether the status quo ante that it seeks 
to restore fulfilled some independent standard of distribution that each member of a 
community could regard as just. In this sense, corrective justice and distributive justice appear 
permanently in tension (Goodin 1991: 144, 149; Weinrib 2002). The objection to the 
compensatory account that arises from this consideration is that the pre-existing distribution 
of rights and resources that climatic compensation aims to recreate may appear unjust on a 
range of accounts of global and domestic justice. The compensatory approach may recreate 
this injustice thereby preventing a move to a more just and environmentally sustainable 
division of resources within the targeted states (Wrathall et al 2015).  
 Such concerns, though understandable, are not decisive.  First, the process of correcting 
climatic injustice through compensation may reasonably be seen as a necessary first step 
towards the elimination of social structures that produce impoverishment and vulnerability. 
Such compensation could be expected to help victims of adverse climate changes cope with 
disruptions in their lives which hinder their ability to engage in debates about social justice 
from a position of equality and security. The compensatory approach, moreover, is fully 
compatible with mechanisms of global or domestic justice that redistribute wealth alongside, 
or after, compensation policies have been enacted (Goodin 1991: 157-8).  Second, while 
compensation for loss and damage may not be sufficient to guarantee a society stays on the 
22 
 
path of climate-resilient development, it can nevertheless play a critical role in this task by 
linking participation of compensatory mechanisms to reasonable efforts to increase climate 
resilience even if the authorization and size of specific awards is not linked to such concerns. 
Third, it can simply be disputed that it is the function of loss and damage policies to bring 
about ‘structural transformation’ since this might be seen as the distinctive focus of policies 
of adaptation. The idea is that increasing resilience is an important element of the climate 
change response but recognising its importance does not mean that it should be the primary 
focus of loss and damage policy. Instead, while mitigation and adaptation aim at reducing 
vulnerability (to future loss and damage), policies of loss and damage aim at making ‘whole 
again’ victims of loss or damage as and when it occurs.  
 
Conclusion  
The discourse of loss and damage has rapidly risen to prominence in the climate change policy 
arena in recent years motivated by the recognition that significant setbacks of interest will 
arise regardless of how effective policies of mitigation and adaptation are at limiting their 
causes. The urgency of responding to these ‘residual’ costs of climate change is underlined by 
their disproportionate impact on impoverished populations located in the developing world.  
 We have argued that compensatory justice, as captured by the notions of ends-based and 
means-based compensation, explains how and why the international community should take 
action rather than merely leaving the victims to bear these costs alone. This is by no means 
intended to be a full account of climate compensation, but merely a framework of a plausible 
account. Issues that need to be resolved within this framework include the question of which 
ends, both economic and non-economic, are of sufficient importance to merit compensation 
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and the balance between compensatory and distributive values.  In the interim, we conclude 
by sketching three policy implications of the compensatory account. 
 Getting the response right: A compensatory approach to loss and damage will mirror the 
feature of just compensation more generally that the type of compensation offered to victims 
of loss and damage must correspond closely to the loss or damage they have endured (Goodin 
1989). Compromises to ends, or alternatively the means we use to fulfil these ends, generate 
two separate problems of climatic injustice and accordingly demand two distinct solutions. 
Any compensation of a damaged end (such as a lost livelihood) with an unrelated end or 
means (such as money or alternative housing) would substitute ‘unlike for unlike’ rather than 
‘like for like’ and so preserve injustice.  Substituting ‘like for like’ may prove problematic or 
costly. What is a means for some might be regarded as an end by others, it might be disputed 
that a substitution of ends leads to the same overall satisfaction, and the process of 
compensation may require financial transfers that the international community find 
unreasonable. Getting the compensation right is essential since climatic changes that 
threaten human ends involve a greater injustice than climatic changes that threaten human 
means. This is because the former necessarily involves a threat of a loss of a unique and valued 
form of life whereas the latter involves a threat that, even if realised, permits subsequent 
action to avoid the loss of an end through repair or substitution of ‘means for means.’  
 The need to go beyond compensation. Ends-based compensation cannot remove all traces 
of climatic injustice since restoring the level of overall satisfaction to an agent cannot offset 
totally the injustice of being forced to remodel their lives by forces beyond their control. This 
is another feature carried over from general theories of compensation as reversal of 
disruption of reasonable expectations (Goodin 1989: 73). Moreover, in a range of cases, 
populations facing extreme climate changes may face ‘uncompensable losses’ in the sense 
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that (1) no replacement end (or combination of replacement ends) could bring affected 
individuals back up to the level where they enjoy the same overall satisfaction as they enjoyed 
before their ends were disrupted by climate change or (2) it is simply not possible to repair or 
replace some of the means damaged by climate change that a person would require to 
continue pursuing a life of equal satisfaction. In each case an injustice persists and must be 
recognised by loss and damage policy even though it cannot be fully corrected. The 
appropriate response to such circumstances, however, is not to ignore these injustices, or 
abandon the compensatory account, but rather to engage in measures of ‘satisfaction’ that 
are in one sense beyond compensation even though they fit with its primary aim to strive to 
make the victim’s whole again. 
 Priority of prevention and adjustment over all forms of compensation. Policies of 
mitigation, adaptation and compensation should be viewed as complementary but not fully 
substitutable. They are complementary because effective mitigation and adaptation will 
result in that fewer human means and ends being compromised thereby reducing the need 
for compensation of any sort. They are non-substitutable, as no amount of mitigation or 
adaptation can now avoid the need to compensate vulnerable populations for significant loss 
and damage. As noted earlier, this is due to the limitations of adaptation policies, the 
consideration that some loss and damage is inevitable due to inertial properties of the climate 
system, and the fact that some loss and damage has already occurred. But there is a further, 
forward-looking point: putting too much emphasis on compensation - and thereby under-
emphasizing policies of mitigation and adaptation - is a risky method of avoiding the harmful 
impacts of climate change since compensatory demands may become overwhelming as 
damages accumulate and, as we have seen, ends-based compensation should be viewed as a 
last resort in that it always leaves the victims experiencing a residue of injustice. This suggests 
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that mitigation and adaptation should be seen as priorities so long as the ends of vulnerable 
populations are under threat (which is very often the case given the effects of changes in 
climate such as global warming and sea-level rises). Correctly understood, the ‘third pillar’ of 
climate change policy strengthens, rather than undermines, the two pillars from whose 
limitations it emerged. 
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